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Qhkrtm om
A certain proposition, widely used by 3t. Thomas
and Aristotle as a premise In scientific demonstrations
will- be the subject of this thesis.

Ircw an erawtnation

of the proposition as used by those two philosophers, the
oarpose of this Inquiry should become clear.
Let us look first to the works of Aristotle.

The

..hyai.cs of Aristotle leads ultimately to an unmoved movent.
]?ooka VTI and VZZZ deal mainly with tie problem of demon*
Pirating the existence of this movent.
with moving thingsi

Aristotle begins

"Mow the existence of motion is

asserted by all who have anything to say about nature.

.1

To

show that moving tilings need a movent, Aristotle supplies
this further premise t

’’everything that Is in motion must be

moved by something."

The truth of this second proposition

is not evident, however, and must be established by a
demonstration.
Aristotle does this in a number of ways.

Xt is in

this context that the proposition, about which this thesis
^Aristotle, Physics, in The Works of Aristotle, ed.
»i. D . Hose (Oxford, 1935), viTTT (2&5b 15)* all quotations
of and references to Aristotle in this paper are from this
edition.
2 Ibid. vll.l (241b 24).

1
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xt)

concerned, arises,

^fter stating tii® above proposition,

urretotle offers as proof:
-.otionj is
tuat

not

tns

'Yor

if it (tiiat which is in

of motion itself it is evident

souree

it is aoved by somet.iing o't .er than

i t s e l f .

bis

justification of tuis becomes clear ir» tae beginning of
coo* VIII of ttre inyslcs.
i.Kjtion” wnich is moved.

it is t*ab which is '’capable of

ror 11’ a thing begins

to

move "it

xoiiowa fcixat before tne action in question, anotiier caange
or cot ion must nave taken place in wibLch tnat wuicn was
capable of being moved or causing motion had its becoming."
And a similar line of reasoning must apply to a thing which
comes to rest.*1
Ti.e proposition iiere expressed, which is used to
the statement that everything wnicn is in motion

justify

must be moved by another, simply states that a being
capable of motion must be acted
m o t i o n . 11

upon

by "another change or

later in the same book, Aristotle speaks on the

same subject in terms

of

potentiality and actuality.^

That

which is capable cl beingwmoved is potentially in motion,
'me

movent, tuat is, tirnt wnicn

activity:

moves,

is already in

"in fact, that which produces tue form is always

sorsething that possesses it."

Cue potentially moveable,

3~
buys»

vii.l

14 i b i d . v i i i . l

1 >»
(2 5 7 b

7-lfi*

^ ibid* viii.5 V257b 7-U>.
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3
therefore, must be taoved by something aetual.

Hence the

fact that every being in notion oust be moved by another
is clear*

Xt is argued that (a) things are in notion}

but (b) things capable of notion must be moved by something
in a state of actuality} therefore, (c) whatever is in
notion is moved by another.
St. Thomas begins his first proof of the existenee
of God in the sane tone as Aristotle's proof of the exist*
£

enoe of the first mover*

Xt is evident from the senses

that some things are in motion*

Mere he adds that "owns

autea good aovetur* ab alio move tor *w

St. Thomas' first

problem in the first part of the proof is the same as
Aristotle's*

to show that everything that is in motion is

soved by another,

it is not surprising that he uses a

similar proposition to the one used in the Aristotelian
demonstration previously examined.

A thing which is moved

is moved according as it is in potency.
lioves according as it is in act*

That which moves,

Indeed, motion is the

.reduction of a being from potency to act} *de poteatia autsm
m n potest allquid reduel in actum, nisi per aliouod ens in
acta.*

St. Thomas actually duplicates the Aristotelian

demonstration on this point, though he seems to give a more

6 3*int Xnoua Aqulna*, 3«ni»tl

Aaulytl*... £ g e &

Thcoiogism * * , Matriti ^/Madrid/*' Bibiiotheca de Auctores
IViatianoa, /S35J.7£
* . e textu eritieo leoniano * . j*/.
I, q. 2, a. 3, c*
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k
precise fora to the proposition:

nothins can fee reduced

from potency to act except by a being already in act.
Although Aristotle, in the Phralca. does not seem
to formulate the proposition in terms quite as general as
those of St* Thomas, it is evident that his formulation,
i.e. "that which produces the form is always something that
possesses it,® certainly implies the proposition as stated
by St. Thomas. Moreover, as will fee seen in the next
T
chapter, Aristotle, in Booh XX of the Metaphysics, in an
extensive discussion of the nature of the potential and
the actual, does formulate the proposition in terms which
are almost identical to those used fey St. Thomas Aquinas.
Fro® the foregoing, it Is evident that the
philosophies of feoth of these men coincide in that feoth of
she® are attempting to demonstrate the existence of an on*
isoved mover.
fact.

Each of them accepts motion as an observed

Further, both attempt to demonstrate the proposition

fciiat "everything that is in motion is moved fey another.”
To achieve this end, each brings in a proposition which
states that a feeing potentially in motion must fee moved to
actuality by a feeing which Is already in act.

This latter

proposition is Intricately involved in an important demon*
ittratlem of the existence of a first mover.

This, m

7
See below, p. 11.
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5
itself, is enough to testify to the Inherent importance of
the proposition, for to deny the validity of this statement
is to deny the validity of the proofs.
This proposition is more than a tool in a
demonstration of an unmoved mover.

It is a unique expres

sion of nature as seen by each of these sen.

The whole of

the Physic a and the f4etanhysics of Aristotle can be regarded
hs a presentation of the order of things, from the lowest
inanimate object, to the highest— the unmoved movents.

In

an absolute sense, the higher has more being that the lower.
In relation to activity, it is the higher than sets on the
lower.

For the higher possesses actually what the lower

possesses only potentially.

Hence, to be reduced to

actuality, the lower must be acted on by the higher.

The

same line of reasoning applies to the philosophy of St.
Thomas Aquinas.

Most of his great works, such as the Summa

faaolo&l&c and the sutama Contra Gentiles. begin with God
and show how ail other being is ordered to this God,

The

relationship between the higher and the lower Is one in
which the former is always acting on the latter and the
highest being, God, would in effect act on all things.
Thus, the proposition, "no being in potency can be reduced
to act except by a being In act” is at the very core of the
philosophies of Ht. Thomas and Aristotle,
Kow, it is neoessary that the proof of the
proposition be established; for without it, order in
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6
philosophy has little reason.

That is, if things are not

velated through higher beings actualizing the potencies of
lower beings, it is difficult to see how there could be an
order in things.

To deny any relationship between the

.lower and the higher is to m k m every individual thing a
little ‘island* of being responsible for its own actuality,
i'or, if no being is dependent for its activity on another,
all things oust be said to be self-subslstent in regard
to their activity.

A universe of sslf~subslstent beings,

towever, is not a universe which implies order,
in fact, imply the opposites

it would,

the activity of one being

would be completely random in relation to the activity of
another.

Hence the truth of the aforementioned proposition

is not only important, but necessary for the development of
order in philosophy.
The purpose of this thesis is to consider whether
the proposition *that which is in potency can be reduced to
act only by a being in act* is demonstrable or noti and if
so, tow it is to be demonstrated! if not, how the truth of
the proposition cay be seen more clearly.

This is not a

textual study of the proposition as it appears In the
writings of the two aforementioned philosophers.

It is

rather an attempt to Judge whether an important philosophic
statement is, or is not, tame.
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r
In tii© second anu tnird caaptera we will consider
tnis proposition as it is found in the works of Aristotle
and it. Thomas Aquinas respectively.

Hie nature of

demonstration from first principles will be ttt* subject
of the fourtn adapter,

in the fifth chapter, I will

exanine the act and potency proposition in respect to
final causality.

Separating this from the final adapter,

in which tie proposition will be considered from the point
of view of efficient causality, will be an examination of
certain objections encountered in the writings of David
Hume.
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CHAPTER TWO
Since toe proposition in question concerns set
and potency, are will begin to# more detailed examination of
Aristotle with a consideration of what he has to say on the
potential and the actual.

Although there are frequent

references to act and potency throughout the works of
Aristotle, perhaps his most explicit statement on the
subject coses in the Metaphysics where almost all of Book
IX is devoted to a consideration of the nature of potency
and act.
Aristotle opens Book IX of the Metaphysics with
hia discussion of the potential,

he begins by pointing out

that potency can be understood in several ways.1 lie adds
that many of these may be neglected in his discussion of
the meaning of potency, although they are all related to a
primary type:
But all potencies that conform to the same type
are originative sources of some kind, and are
called potencies in reference to one primary
kind of potency, which is an originative source
of change In another thing or in the thing
itself oua other .2
Kor instance, a potency for being acted on well mist be
1 Aristotle, Metaphysics ix.I (1046a 4 If*.
c lbl--l. Ix.I \>iu46a 6-13;.
8
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referred to a ‘'prior kind of potency, tuat is, a potency
for being acted on, for the former assumes the latter.*^
The fundamental meaning of potency for Aristotle is, there
fore, the capacity to change or to be changed.

A body at

rest is said to hare the capacity to novel a cold body is
able to be warns,

Potency signifies the capacity of a thing

to change or be changed.
Aristotle describes the activity of a thing by
developing a contrast with potency.1
1 A man who is capable
of studying science Is contrasted to the man who is
studying science.
is

From this, It Is evident that the act

the fulfilment of the p o t e n c y . 5

involved in the tran

sition from potency to act is charge or motion.^

For

example, building is required in the construction of a
house.

Xt is not, however, the motion which is described

by the term *aeb*t

"for every motion Is incomplete—

making thin, learning, walking, building."

In the building

of a house, the act is the end; that Is, the house Itself,
rather than the motion, i.e. the building, which is an
incomplete act.

There are cases in Which the motion and

n iM iii< n m N M W M m n M M »

\

3 Metaph. ix.I ( W M 5 a

17).

k Ibid. ix .6 (lot8a 25 ff«).
5 ibid. lx .6 (lo48a 35), "The thing that stands in
contrasi' tb each of these 2 * aatn capable of studying, etc .7
exists actually. There the actual is the fulfilment of
the potential, in that the contrast to a capacity must
always be the fulfilment of thatcapacity.”

6

Ibid. ix .6 ( U # 8b

18 ff.).
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10
end are ono.

Such is the case with seeing, (tbs notion)

and sight (tbs act) which occur siwiiltaasoualy.

Only la

cases such as this can the notion he referred to as aa act*7
It follows that in ths very definitions of the
terms 'act' and 'potency', a kind of relationship is set up
between the two*

That is, in defining a potency, one must

do so with the recognition of a corresponding act.

For

Instance, to say that an object is capable of notion destands
a prior knowledge of actual action.

Xt is for this reason

that Aristotle can may that actuality is by definition
prior to potency!
* . , for that which Is in the primary sense
potential is potential because it is possible for
it to bee©me active . . . so that the formula and
knowledge of the one oust precede the knowledge
of the other.0
Hence, Aristotle regards act as prior to potency in the
sense that the knowledge of the potential depends on a
prior knowledge of the actual.
Though the truth of this stateeent is apparent,
it does not illuaine the proposition that no being can be
reduced froa potency to act except by a corresponding act.
dimply to say that we know an act before we know Its cor
responding potency, and that we speak of the latter in
teres of the former, does not necessarily indicate a causal

7 *»*aph.

ix.6 (lo46b

33).

8 Ibid, ix.8 (lukgb 13).
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IX
connection between them.

What Aristotle has developed in

tnis place Is a contrast between set and potency end very
little ©ore.

For, because our knowledge of the actual is

first in the order of understanding, this does not mean
that the actual is first in the real order of things*

To

assert this would be imposing the order in which the Bind
functions, that is, a logical order, on the real order,
an imposition for which there may be no Justification*

Xt

is knowledge that oust conform to reality, not reality to
knowledge*

Hence, the problem of a causal relationship

between potency and act is, as yet unsolved*
Aristotle goes on to show that act is not only
prior by definition, but that it is also prior in sequence
cr in tJUse.

He wants to show that before a being in

potency can be
in act.

reduced to act, there must be areal being

To explain this,

Aristotle points outthat a man

sust be produced by another m a m
From the potentially existing the actually exist*
ing is always produced by an actually existing
thing, a man by a man • • • there is always a first
mover and the mover always exists actually*'*
here we find Aristotle using the proposition that a poten
tial being is made actual by an actual being! that is, it is
reduced to act

by a being in act.

It seems in this instance

that Aristotle

is using a causal proposition, *froa

Meta ph. ix.S (10*9b 23).
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12
potentially existing, the actually existing is always
produced fey an actually existing tiling,w to deaonstrate
that act ausfc fee prior to potency in time.

For if, as the

causal proposition states, act is by nature prior to potency
-t must also fee prior in sequence or tiiae.
Aristotle does not » m m to attempt to prove this
causal proposition, but Merely uses it as a premise in
uother proof.
cation?

Is as,justified in ais use of this propo-

It would seen tost a proposition, which states a

reiatlonsaip between two things, should point to something
on which this relationship is based.

The problem here is

bust Aristotle, in allowing this proposition to stand on its
own terns, seems to fee assuming the relationship.

Or, be#

cause he does not refer it to anything orior for its
justification, the possibility of the proposition feeing
self-evident arises.

Aristotle does not, however, show

i»ow the relationship is evident.
problem remainss

And thus the original

Is the statement,

1every

feeing in potency

can fee reduced to act only fey a feeing in sot*, true?
This problem applies not only to the proposition
stated above but it also applies to a number of more
specific propositions used fey Aristotle that derive their
validity fro® the one based on act and potency.

For

example, ’’everything that come* to be, cooes to fee fey the
agency of something,** a proposition widely used in Booh VII
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qx the Metaphysics, Is simply a more specific ass of the
act and potency proposition*lu that is, it is tits sans
proposition tut In less universal terms*

Similarly in

Books VII and VIII of tue fnyslos. we nave seen that
Aristotle employs the set and potency proposition to snow
that whatever is in motion is in motion Because of the
agency of the movent.11

Since the proof of this proposition

depends on the truth of the act and potency proposition, a
truth which has not yet Seen made clear, judgment con
cerning the existence of a prime movent oust he deferred
for the present.
let us turn to Aristotle’s discussion of notion
In Book VIII of the Physics for the purpose of justifying
the proposition, 'a being in potency can he reduced to act
only by a being in set*.

Aristotle, in his proof of the

existence of a first mover, begins by saying that a being
in motion requirea a mover.

To show the validity of this

statement he points out that a being which comes into
motion must be brought into motion by a being whleh is
already in act, that is, by a moving thing or movent.
Aristotle defines motion as Hthe fulfilment of the moveable
insofar as it is moveable.”12 For the Stagirlte this
10

Metaoh. vli.T (lo32a 12).

11

Flys, vii.l (341b 24 f£),

12 Ibid. viil.l (2^la
(25Tb 7 ) 7 "

9j*

See also Phya. vill.5
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usatetaent mean* that "in eaen kind of motion It is that
which la capable of motion that la in motion."3^

He later

aids that,
. . . the moveable is moved and this is potentially,
not actually, in motion, but the potential is in
process to actuality • . , the,movent, on the other
hand, is already in activity,**
In support of these statements, Aristotle offers a proposition that we have already scent

"that which produces the

form is always some thins that possesses it.”1-*
this argument gives a good insight to Aristotle's
view on act and potency.

By examining a being which at m e

moment lacks motion and then in another moment acquires
motion, Aristotle points out that in the former case the
being must have had the capacity for motion, that is, It
m a t have been potentially In motion, whereas in the latter
instance we have an actually moving being.

Aristotle must

go on to snow how this change took place.

There would seem

to be two possible conclusions to this problems

that the

acquired motion was caused by the thing itself that moved
or that it was caused by another being.*6

However, it is

13 Pfaar». *111.1 (251* 13).
w

IWa. *111.5 (25Tb T).

x5 Ibid. *111.5 <257!» 9).
16 1*14. *11.1 (241. 25).
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unthinkable that a thing "should in its entirety move it*
self . , ,!

thus it would at the same time be both teaching

and being taught, or restoring to and being restored to the
same health,"1?

The thesis that a tiling might be responsible

for its own motion then falls into absurdity18 and it would
appear that the second thesis must be ehosent

that every*

tiling that is in motion must be moved by another,
Let ua examine this argument closely.

It states

that since a being must be considered incapable of moving
itself, it must be moved by another.

Furthermore, the

reason that a being is incapable of moving Itself is that
it lacks motion.1^

Benoe it would seem apparent that the

being which is the cause of its motion must already possess
notion; that is, a mover mist be a movent.
Is this argument satisfactory?

If it is, by

showing that every thing in motion demands a movent, it

17 Pfrrs. viii.5 (257b 2).
18 s** Phy*. viii.5 (257b

12). It is important to
remember here that the moveable is only potentially
moveable and must derive its fulfilment from something
actually in motion. Bence even if a thing appears to move
itself, it is clear that one part of this thing must move
another.
1**
* This is the key question in the argument of
Aristotle* that motion can only be caused by that which
lb in motion.
If this statement is true, then the rest
of the argument follows.
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sa / .asily be argu. 1 W i t w e actualization of i being in
rcter.cy iemands a toeing in act.2u
?;oUi m demand a mover?

Eat, doe# every being in

We mast further Inquire into tne

reason beuind this statement*

;»'or, to state W u t a tuing

potentially in motion simply points out tr.at the thing
ear move*

Similarly, to state tt at a being nas the corres-

pan u n g act merely mean a that W e being is an motion.

But,

to state that a being in potency car. be reduced to act only
c j a ceing in act connects act ani aotency causally.

The

first two statements axe matters of observation, but the
final proposition, wnicn connects tae two terms, demands
some sort of Justification.

In regard to things wnich move

(from potency to actj, Aristotle gives two possibilities:
W a t the thing either moves itselfor ismoved by another.
i owever,

in view of what has just been said,it would

that tnere la a third possibility:

see®

that there is no causal

relation between act and potency} i.e. that a being can be
in motion with no mover at all,2A
Aristotle does not entirely ignore this problem in
the Physics.

In tne first chapter of Book VIII, he attacks

tne- notion held by some of his predecessors that motion is
rot eternal, but rather can vanish and reappear.22
2o

dee below, p. 58.

cx

Bee below, p. tyj.

*2

Phyg. viii.l (2pfc. 1 ££,) .
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Aristotl* points out, "Is everywhere the causa of order*“
tnat is, "that which is produced or directed by nature can
never be anything disorderly.”

Aristotle goes on to show

that to hold that a notion may cone to be without there
being a previous notion is incomputable with the above
statements
But if we say that there is first a state of rest
for an infinite tine, and then notion is started
at sons moment, and that the fact that it is
this rather thrn sons previous nonent is of no
importance, and involves no order, then we can
no longer say that it is nature*s work.**3
In this teat, Aristotle is examining the possibility that
i. thing nay begin to move without there being a preceding
activity to account for this notion, in which case, there
Mould be no order involved.

This would not be a natural

covenant, for "nature is everywhere the cause of order."
Whether Aristotle regards this as a demonstration
of the eternality of motion or not is not explicitly in
dicated.

An examination of the text which follows, however,

Mould see® to indicate that the eternality of notion is
demonstrable,

he points out that:

It would be better, therefore, to say with
Empedocles and anyone else who nay have aalntaisssd such a theory as his jfthat a notion any
cone to be with no preceding notion? that the
universe is alternately at rest and in notion:

23 JSaa*

viii.l (252a 13 - 17).
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for in « system of thi« kind no nave at ones ft
certain order. But even here the holder of the
theory ought not only to assert the faets he
ought also to explain the cause of it» i,e.
he should not tasks any sere assumption or lay
down any gratuitous axiom, but should employ ^
either induetire or demonstrative reasoning,"**
Although this text is primarily intended as a criticism of
Empedocles, one fact seems dear:
problem can be reasoned to.

the solution to the

Aristotle later adds in the

aaro* critique that,
. . • while his theory is right insofar as it is
applied to certain individual oases, he is wrong
in asking it of universal application, thus, a
triangle always has its angles equal to two right
angles, but these is nevertheless an ulterior cause
for the eternity of this truth, whereas first
_
principles are eternal and have no ulterior cause."**'
t.iere are then certain truths which are eternal but should
not be laid down as first principles! the reason for this
being that these truths have an ulterior cause and hence,
can be demonstrated from that cause.
In view of what has Just been said, it would seen
that Aristotle*a proposition, that every notion which comes
to be requires a preceding motion, Js such a truth} that is,
it is eternally true but it is not a first principle sines
there is an ulterior cause for its truth.

And this ulterior

cause would appear to be order or its cause, nature.

Since

every reduction from potency to act is a kind of motion, then
24 S E E -

(252a

20),

25 Xbld. viil.l (252b 1).
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seen that c very sue), re duction demands a preceding
■ - ■* *

This isay, nowever, be pushing tee Aristotelian
t e x t too far, for as we have seen, h e

loco not seem to use

kaeh a proof in his specif].-.: references to act and potency.
;c, since, in tnis .Instance, Aristotle is referring to
•cotton and since the reduction fro;.’ potency to act is so
ioseiy connected with motion, it would be reasonable to
•o

lude that the act tn! potency proposition was not re

garded by ‘ristotle as a first principle.

It woul7 further

appear that the key to this problem might be found through
; study of nature arid order,

be will first, aowaver, turn

to the writings of the great mediaeval pnilosopner and
tueologian -/no al,o made constant use of the principle
*iio bo ’.ny in potency .-an be reduced to act except by a
~tL

.- i

H
.iO

O

.
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In the first chapter, it y&s seen that St. Thesis'
onilosophy, like that of Aristotle, was very much dependent
on order.

While realising on the one hand that the world

is fall of different grades of beings, St. T h o m s saw on
the other that these beings were all related In some way
and that all of them bore some resemblance to beings of
other order*.1 As a result his philosophy accounts for
all beings In one order.

Intricately involved in his

philosophy are certain propositions which are expressive
of this carder.

The proposition in question, that nothing

can be reduced from potency to act except by a being in
act. Is one of these propositions.
It is now necessary to inquire in detail into
the writings of St. Thomas in order to discover in what way
'm amices use of the proposition and, of even greater Im
portance, to ascertain whether tiur* is, in his writings,
* M M a « w « M w w ia a N M W lili|

. 1 a s - Thsol. I, A 7, 3, c.
. dlcendmn quod lose
ordo in rebus sic a Deo ereatls existeasT unitatea mundi
I^Te^iirtaius e
n
im
*
isfe
u
^
a
fS
^
'u
n
ita
te'W
S
m
is
.
*Wr&l3i'' S R H r a r f g * ^^ e a l m g
fheol. I. 11. 5. c. *Qenia enla quae sunt, invenluntur
Issee ordinate ad invleea. 'hum' auaedae culbuadaB aeservlunt•w
•sja-«iio S c rse n :
L u .
'
ordo consldcrsnduain rebus. ifaus. q u o aliauid oresturn
!?rainatur .3 iJliid
.... .. Uio»orf<>. quo o m i t
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any indication of whether tuas proposition can be demon
strated, and if

bo,

aow it is to be demonstrated*

With

regard to his use of the proposition, it has been seen that
it m s employed by it. T h o m s in his proof of the existence
of God in the iutama Xheolo^iae,^ a passage that closely
2 Joseph Owens, G.
"The Problem of the Prima Via,’*
; odern Schoolman, XXX ( 1 j 5 2 ) , pp. 33-53 (fart I), father
Owens, wnen he considers the first premise in the first way
of demonstrating the existence of God, i.e. that which is
moved is moved by another, states that Jt. Thomas does not
accept this proposition in any "a priori way", but rather
that m concludes it from "wnat is seen happening in the
sensible world." it. f.iomas, he points out, uses the ex
ample of "wood wnich is cold . . . being heated by fire,"
to derive this proposition.*
"Insofar as the wood is being
moved from cold to heat, it is in potency to being hot.
This is at once seen to be a necessary condition for being
moved. The thing tiiat is being moved has to be in potency
to taat towards which it is being moved. That which is im
parting the motion, on the otner iuuid, must be actual in
inis respect,"
It is at this point ti*ai the problem arises. While it
i* true tiiat a moving tiling is changing f r o m potency to act
and tiiat before a thing can actually have a certain act, it
must nave the capacity for taut act, there is still no grounds
for relating potency to act causally* The act and potency
proposition not only expresses the meaning of potency and
act, but it also relates them in a special way. If we
assume this relationship, tuen any analysis of the propo
sition need only be a definition of the terms. And tills is
want Father Owens seems to have done, lie analyzes motion
in terms of potency and act assuming that potency is re
lated to act causally, hence the basis for the solution
of the problem is, for ratner- Owens, that act must be
"cometiling over and above potency, something ©ore than
potency," and also that act 'has to come fro© something
Wiiica already aaa or is tiiat act." Trie problem with this is
tne same as above: that act is something above potency is
clear from a definition of the terms but the final statesent Is one that implies a relationship, and doe® not
necessarily follow from a definition of tm terms.
it must be seen uere that in a very real sense the
statement that rather Owens analyzes as the basis of the
proposition that ’everything that is in motion is moved
by another* is no more than tiiat proposition in terms of
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araiiela a similar demonstration In Aristotle's Physics.3
ol. Tlioreas, however, does not by any means restrict his
employment of this proposition to this question.

For

example, we find the proposition used in answering the
question:

’’Whether God is a Body?"

decundo, quia neeeaae est id quod est primum
ens, esse in actu, et nulio rrodo in potentla.
ulcet enirn in uno et eodem quo! exit de potentla
in actum, prius sit potentla qoam actus tempore,
aimpliciter tamen actus prior est potentla:
quia quo a est in potentla, non reducltur in
actum nisi per ens actu. Gstensum est autea
supra quod deus est oriasua ens. Xmpossibile est
igltur quod In ieo sit uliquid in potentla.
Omno autem corpus est in potentla: quia con
tinuum, inquantum huiusmodi, divlaibile est in
infinitum* impossicile est igitur Deum esse
corpus.4*
fnis proof is a very simple and a very convincing
one.

God is known to he the first of all beings (primum

ens).

And since act is prior to potency, it must be said

that there can be no

potency

in God.

It follows therefore

tiiat, since every bo iy is in potency, God cannot be con
sidered to be a body.

The only part of this proof that seems

act and potency. In this sense tnen tue 'basis* and tne
proposition are one. Hence if we assume this basis or this
relationship between potency raid act to arrive at the pro
position 'that which is in motion is moved by another*, then
we are actually assuming this latter proposition in the be
ginning. because Father Owens In fact has not explained the
relationship between potency and act, the problem remains
unsolved.
3 Phya. vii.l (24 lb 24 ff>;.
** 4ug» fheol. I, 3, 1,
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no require explanation Is the statement that in the absolute
mense, aet Is prior to potency* at* Thomas explains this
lay saying that In the reduction from potency to act, there
must first be a being in act:

"quod est in potentla. non

reducltur in actum nisi per ens aetu.”
Again, as in the demonstration of the existence of
Godt, at. Thomas uses the act and potency proposition as tbs
nole basis for a demonstration.$

Without the use of this

proposition there is no demonstration at all.

There is

also, as in the aforementioned demonstration, no explanation
given concerning the use of this proposition.

Can it be

concluded from this that no explanation is necessary?

That

is, since, in these two Important demonstrations, the pro
position stands on its own, it would see©that
./cgarded by St. Thomas as
proposition.

itmight be

aself-evidentorperse nota

Let us first, however, consider some other

Instances In which this proposition is used.
St. Thomas makes use of the act and potency pro
position In his treatise on the intellectual powers of the
soul in the Susans Theoloalae on a question concerning the
agent intellect.

He has previously shown that in order to

iunderstand a thing it is necessary that we have a possible
intellects6 that Is, a knowing power which is capable of
5 3«« Sum. Thcol. I. 2, 3, c.
6 Ibid. X, 79, 2, c.
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knowing prior to the act of knowledge,

The problem now

becooes to show that we also need an agent intellect to
actualize the possible intellect.

The possible intellect

arrives at knowledge by acquiring the forms of natural things.
But since the forms of natural things do not themselves
exist apart from matter, there must be an active principle
to raise these forms to the possible intellect*
• • • formae antes in «ateri& exlstentes non stmt
Intelliglblles aetu* sequebatur quod naturae seu
formae rerun sensibiliun, quas intelligimus, non
assent Intelliglblles actu. Nihil auten redueitur
de potentla in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actus
sicut sensue fit in aetu per seitslbllle in actu.
Oportebat Igitur ponere ailquam virtutea ex parte
intelleetus. quae faeeret mtelllglbllla in actu,
per abstractions* speelerwa a conditlonibus
materlaXlbus, it haee est necessitas ponendi
Intellectual agentem.*
This demonstration provides an excellent exaaple
of the absolute necessity given to this proposition.

We

know that we have the capacity to know various things.

It

is, however, necessary to explain how we acquire these things
as knowledge.

That is, it is necessary to explain how what

is potentially known becomes actually known.

And since the

object of knowledge is itself, prior to the act of knowing,
not actually intelligible, then the object Itself cannot be
the sole cause of knowledge.

For the acquisition of a fens

by the Intellect is a reduction free potency to act, and
since "nihil autem redueitur de ootentia in actum. nisi
7

I&SS&"

79, 3, c.

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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ser allquod
duinh

m m

acta."

Uv&n

there aunt be posited a power

Is In act which can cause the sensible species to

become intelligible.

It should be noted here that although

the demonstration is pointing to a power of which aost
people would be entirely unaware, dt. Thomas is not positing
simply a guess or a probability, but rather a necessity:
f,it haee est necesaitas oonendl intellectua agentem."
The whole demonstration rests, as did the one in
milon

it was seen that God could not be a body, on the

proposition that nothing can be reduced
except by a being in act.

from

potency to act

As in the other demonstration, it

is used as though it were a first principle or per se nota
proposition.

If the proposition is true then the conclusion

must be true; but if the proposition is either not true, or
if the truth of the proposition is not yet properly esta*
blisned, then the demonstration cannot be regarded as true
or at least as properly established.
Are these demonstrations offered by dt. Thomas
sound?

In other words, is he justified in positing the

existence of an active power simply because he is aware of
a potential one.

It would seem, from the way in which it.

Thomas uses the proposition, tiiat he is accepting it as
evident.

At least, the absence of any explanation for his

use of the proposition would lead one to conclude that he
supposed that no explanation was needed.

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
' ‘3391
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Is Gt. Thomas justified in treating tnis as a per
sc nota proposition?

It sight be objected that the real

reason for tne acceptance of this proposition is that with
out it, the reduction from potency to act would, in a sense,
ci’y intelligibility.

For instance, without positing an

ngent intellect the process of knowing Is not intelligible,
for it cannot be seen now the object potentially known be
comes actually known.

To posit an active power in this case

renders the process intelligible.

However, this, in itself,

does not Justify the use of the proposition.

For, simply,

because something must be true according to the order in
wuich the intellect functions, it is not necessarily true
outside of tiiat order, that is, in the piiysical order,
fuerefore the relationship between this proposition and the
aysic&l order is not yet established,

what is clear is

uiat the proposition is closely linked with it. Thomas*
view of the real order.
ve see evidence of this in his
tue existence of God.

demonstration of
fi

In the first proof,v he points out

i.iiat there is an order of movers and things moved.
union is in act moves that which Is
'.duality.

k

in potency to a state of

In another proof,- ne speaks of order

of causality.

That

interms

That which has being is tne cause of being.

hum. Theol. I,

2,

3* JFrlma Via7.

'' ffcld. I, 2, 3, /Secunda Via?.
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And again, in another p r o o f , h a sees an order of perfec
tion in things.

Certain things are more perfect and other

things are less perfect.

The m e of the terms were and

less indicates a relationship between things, and nenae,
order.

In fact his *proofs* for the existence of God can

be taken as comprising a whole; that is, one proof, in
which an order In things is seen, an order which leads to a
first mover or first cause or a first In whatever parti
cular order soy be under consideration.
in the writings of sit, fttomas, as in the works of
Aristotle, carder seems to be tnat wnich opposes random
activity of any wort.-1*

Eandom activity Implies that

activity of a being which has no relation to any other
being.

In this sense then, a motion can be considered

random If it is caused by nothing, and if it is aovlng to
wards nothing.

Order, on the other hand, in opposing random

activity, implies an activity which bears a relation to some
other.

In this way, St. Thomas* proof of the existence of

God is a proof based on orders

the relation of moved to

irovent, effect to cause and less perfect to more perfect.
10 3 m , Theol. I, 2, 3, Q u a r t s Via?.
See p. 5.:, footnote 1. In these texts we can clearly
see tiiat for St. Thomas order implies relations "Secundum
q uo:! qaaeiur. ad ali.it ox^lnantur.
In the highest sense,
order can be eonaiderefc "quo omnia create ordinantur in
vejK." These texts seem to'e x c e s s -'clearly 1the "'idea''tKat
order is opposed to anything random.
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as
In an article concerning; the unity of God, 3t«
Tx-ossaa hag occasion to refer to the order in nature.

In

this particular article ne wants to enow t.-at God, toe
cause of all things, must be one.

fo this end, he points

out tnat.
Omnia eni© quae sunt, inveniuntur esse ordinata
invlcec,
i u m q u u e i a a qaibusdsua deeerviunt.
Quae antes diverse sunt, in unum ordinem non convenirenfc, nisi ab allquo uno ordinarentur.12
ah

u-uot, therefore, be aaid tuas. God i& one.
This partlcul-i' article bsar$ some examination.
'w.

«.*

, x . a ...

t uv i j w > a *w cuuv a l l
•

4is

j O c 44

-ss vc ■- - ^

ly says that?
:il:\ata ad m y

v 4-4 ^c s>Vs

are

wkt-isw- —v -44v a f i v |

but

V.uniu %-r.ia; quae cunt Inyrnluntur c-ase

I c e*,.

dia <^ua.edah qulbusdum de3ervlunt."

decondly, it is seen m a t m e c c things are 'diverse ••
''.^alh, this la pres usably ar. obvious fact that needs no
'ife-sonstration.
u k

cause,

But diverse things need to be ordered by

This, for our- purposes, is the Important state*

:.i nt in toia text.

For we have here, it would seem, an

upplication of a proposition, similar to the act and potency
{.reposition, as a cause for order in diverse things.

To be

c ause of order is to give soitething an act, timt is, to
...eve aoroething fro© potency to act.
. . v 1

. 14.

x

^

..

4->! 44ne

c u o x

hence tiie reduction
or^er*

ia Sum. Tneol. I, 11, 3, c.
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This is, admittedly, a rather liberal interprc* it ion of the text.

It does, however, imply that there

must be a cause for order.

And how else could one arrive

at this conclusion without regarding ‘ordering• as the
p ’ving and reception of some activity.
is cleart

At least this muou

t h e proposition that *all things are in order*

is dependent on a prior proposition, for it Is evident taat
C'Vier is caused,

since order is the giving of an act or

the reducing from potency to act, it can be seen that this
prior proposition must say that ‘every reduction from potency
to net is caused*.

It further follows that the cause must

itself be in act for nothing can cause that which it itself
lacks.

It would seeia tnen that Gt. Thomas would regard the

act

potency proposition a s prior to the statement tiiat

-ini

"all things that exist are ordered.'*
‘jet us c o n c l u d e with a brief resume of the position*
cf Aristotle «nd it. Thomas.

Although Aristotle made very

little use of the -reposition in question in terms of act
a’-'d -otency, he dii make frequent use of a number of other
prepositions which could be referred to as particular in
stances of the more general statement.

It was further seen

t,\nt in moat Instances, Aristotle use * these propositions
without demonstrating them, although in one text he did inGj.catc that from a knowledge of order it could be seen that
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3c

•*very motion mast be caused.*3
Unlike Aristotle, It. Thomas makes frequent use
cf tne proposition, *no being can bo reduced from potency
to act except by a feeing In act*.
i

In ir-ost caaes, however,

does not make any attempt to Justify the usage of this

proposition, beyond defining the terras*

And in the text

Vi':>1ch 4© have Just examined, he Indicates that order, rather
t

>r<

being prior to the act and potency proposition, is

4 •:usei by it.
In general, there is, I believe, one criticism
that could be justly levelled at these two philosophers:
both failed to consider as

a

serious possibility the ehal-

Iv-.y;-'- of the sceptic, i.e. the reduction from potency to .act
w.d.eh Is uncaused.

That this problem does not occur to thea

&- •: serious one Is evident in the statement used by both of
t'.e rc men that *v:ir-.tcver is !n '-otlor; Id either moved by it*
r. If or is caov" 1 by another *•
a.:eumptlon that
caused.

the

This statement rests on the

motion of anything that is in motion is

ran this assumption be made?

t?c must first take

irto consideration that the motion might be uncaused.
The second problem '.van uo:? ic
kuo/ledge of tnis proposition?
c ;a it be demonstrated?

m

arrive at- the

Is It a first principle or

As we have seen, tills question does

not eeetn to have been answered clearly by either Aristotle
or St. Thomas.
13 see above, pp. 16-17*
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cmafteh foo«

That the act and potency proposition plays an
Important role in tne philosophies of Aristotle and St*
Thomas is evident from tne texts we have considered*

Both

of these philosophers see* to infer that in describing an
ordered universe, a proposition of this nature mast be
accepted*

It has not been seen, however, whether either of

them regarded this proposition as a first principle or a
eta tenant susceptible of demonstration*

for the most part

they seen to accept the proposition on its face value*
There is, in the Phrslea of Aristotle, a ease in
wnicto notion seems to be the necessary result of order
Order implies relation or connection*
ordered is not random*

That Is, what is

It can be seen, however, that random

cotlon (or any random activity) cannot be caused activity,
for causality relates an effect to a cause*

Hence, every

action, indeed every activity, must be caused*

Froo this,

it follows that every reduction from potency to act oust be
caused by a being in act*

In this m y , then, it follows

that since the universe is ordered, any change or notion
must be referred to a cause*
This argument, however, could be reversed.
1 See above, p* 17.
31
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If we

;.2

bo.pln w ith any r e d u c tio n fr o t* p o ten cy t o a c t ,

It

f o llo w s

t.^ a t ttic r e must be some k in d o f m o tio n o r change and, I f

;z say t's-at in any redaction from potency to act, there must
ve a cause wuie». Is itself Ir act, tnen it follows that
'"•.•cry oiotlon or c xnre in t*-#' universe is related to another
iV.otlon or

But tnlr is the type of activity

■‘/■Jiau xS referre I to as ordere *,

.isnce, we pay begin with

ice .and potency proposition and arrive it trie fact that
a.ii-iays must do ordered.
x.xis argum ent,
i . 't e r *

If

aeeais to ta k e on a c i r c u l a r c h a r *

we b e g in w ith o r d e r ,

wo a re

i n e v it a b ly le d t o t t e

fo r m u la tio n o f t.vc a c t and p o ten cy o r >y o u ic io n ,

.»e can ,

. ,/o'voi', c e g iii .«l v>•i v.it. a c t an-i potency prodosxexon and, in
way, a iT iV e a t o rd e r; i . e .

t».e a w and potency

to -a & itio n deuonstrute-; in tno f i r s t argument can be turned
ax jo in and used to
,\J

w
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wl . 1

b t*

i. b
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irfchermore, It follows that tf neither the premise nor the
‘occlusion Is prior to tne other, this ”theory reduces to
t-i>e mere statement that if i thing exists then it must
exist— an easy sny of ^roving any t h i n g . . - I hat actually
oens in a circular orguraent In that the premise must lie
•.It :ciy toe identified with the conclusion.

fonseruently, insofar as the relation of act and
„ nay to order is concerned, we are left with the follow*
i.ap problem:

can either one be demonstrated fro® tne other?

.•or is is clear from vrnat Aristotle has said tnat botn can*
:,.au be at the same time demonstrated fron, and used to demon
strate tae other.

.m are, therefore, left with three

.>ws.^oilitics of .-mien only one can be chosen:

first, that

Owi- ur-lersi-uriing of act ana potency _c prior to our under..ca:,cijig of order ana taac tne latter must be demonstrated
from uiie former; or secondly, tiiat our unaerstanding of
ox- J«r is prior to our understanding of act ana potency and
...a; be used to demonstrate tne act and potency proposition;
cm thirdly, taut neititer act ana potency nor order are prior
to the otner in which case c«ey must ue identified,
r *iore pyx.rig into tuts problem at greater length,

r-.-c us> again tnouire into tae

os ter for Analytics anu con*

cider what Aristotle says on propositions and demonstrations,
ww&ra* cue Beginning °f tula wora, arxscotie summarises his
•3 lost. Anal. 1.3 (72b 3A /.
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own position concerning demonstration*
that not ail knowledge is demonstratives

"our own doctrine is
on the contrary,

Icnowledge of the ismedlate premisses is Independent of
(lemonstratlon.
Concerning premisses which cannot he demonstrated,
Aristotle points oat that "an immediate proposition is one
which has no ether proposition prior to it."5

Further,

'the premisses of demonstrated knowledge mist be true,
primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the
conclusion.
senses s

To be better known can be understood in two

better known in the order of reality and better

Icnown to man.

The former Is mare universal and furthest

fro® sense while the latter is particularly nearest to
isense.7
We mist distinguish between realities in the world
and propositions in the intellect.

Simply because a certain

proposition seems to facilitate explanation does not neces
sarily mean that it truly explains the world of reality.
For instance, the proposition 'all thing# are ordered*, any
lead to conclusions which are invalid because the proposition
i!iay not he a correct expression of order in the world.
4 !a»£*

**3 (72b

18}.

5 Ibid. 1.2 (72a Sj.
6 Ibid. 1.2 (71b 2u}.
7 Ibid. 1.2 (71b 34}.
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the other hand, if the proposition in the Intellect is an
expression of things in the world, then its conclusions
teust folios as true,

Similarly, set arid potency may he

round both in the world or in a proposition in the intellect,
hence a preposition is an intellectual expression.

Before

it can he used in a valid demonstration its truth as
expressive of the real world mist he established.®
Consequently, with regard to order vla*a*vla act*
;md-potency, if one is to be demonstrated from the other, it
isust be shown that the proposition of one is prior to and
better known than the proposition of the other| that is, one
proposition must be more universal than the other.

And in

this context, that which would seem to be referred to is
i;hat which is prior and better known in the least qualified
way.^

If neither of these propositions can be regarded as

immediate, it would seem that there must be another props*
iiition prior to these from which each may be demonstrated.
Bow do we arrive at the first and immediate
ixretslsses?

Our knowledge of those is, according to Aristotle

neither innate nor is it derived from any higher state of
icnowledge.

We must, then, arrive at our knowledge of these

8 Post. Anal. 1.2 (Tib 24).
"■ Ibid. i.2 (72a I). *. . ♦ objects nearer to sense are
in*ior anSTSetter known to taanj objects without qualification
fsrior and better known are those further froo sense. How
the most universal causes are furthest from sense and
particular causes are nearest to sense.8
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l^norat. aed sunt ab omnibus eodetr; aodo et natural Iter
oognJLta. "12

h©

than explains the difference between an

•ndemonstrable principle and a conclusion.

If a man la

questioned on scatters closely related to these principles,
• . • respondebit veritatem de his quae aunt
proplnqua principiis, hablto reapectu ad principlej
et aie deincepa quousque virtutea priaorum porlnclpiorum ad ea de quibua interrogator, applleare
poteat. Ex uoc igitur manifeate apparet quod per
principle prima, In eo qul interrogator, eausatur
cognitlo de novo.^3
Tula snows clearly that ct. Thomas agrees with Aristotle
that the principles are tne cause of the truth of, and are
therefore prior to, the conclusions.
In the above text, St. Tiiomae Indies tea that a
nan can naturally know certain principles free which he
derives his other knowledge,

in fact, St. Thooas points

out that it la the knowledge of principles rather than of
conclusions which is west truly natural to mans
Si its esset a m a s s naturalls cognitio concluslonum
sicut prinoipioruw, eadea esset sententia apud
oanes de conclusion!bus sicut de principiis*
.
quia quae stmt naturalia, sunt eadea apud oaaies.1*
since, however, not all people agree as to conclusions, but
only as to principles, it follows that principles alone are
12 Saint Thomas Aquinas, S.
Contra Pantiles. Torino /furinTT
1 i # a i f e I o &ornna hanuailai77 Idber 11, Cap.
13 summa Contra Oentiles. ii,
W iSiS- ii. 63 3 •

83 ^^p.

83 Jp,

Vjgf.

H£ 7 .
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natural to us. *5
Scientific knowledge, then for St, Thomas comes
as a result of our knowledge o f first principles, tne know*
ledge of waxen we nave naturally.
to Aristotle's.

ius poxnt here is similar

For A r i s t o t l e , s c i e n t i f i c knowledge demands

a starting point, m

Indemonstrable principle waicn is tl*e

cause of trut<> in all of tne conclusions wnieh fall under
it.

This type of knowledge as we nave seen St, Inomas refer

to it, finds Its starting point in Indemonstrable principles
which are naturally known by tne intellect and in turn are
tne cause of tne truth in scientific conclusions.
In addition, as we nave seen in Aristotle, tne
first principles, In order tnat tney may be the cause of
tneir conclusions, must be tne most unleersal, wnicn as we
nave seen entails sieving tne least qualifications,

St.

Thomas reiterates this position wnen ne points out tiiat,
Xatellectus igitur, cum sit una vis, est elus
unuffi naturals obiectum, cuius per se et
naturaliter cognitlonea nabet, noc autem
oportet esse id sub quo comprehenduntur omnia
ab lntellectu cognitat sicut sub ealore comprenenduntur oanes calores, qul stmt per se
visibiles. Quod non est allud quaa ens.
Naturaliter igitur intellectus noster cognescit
ens, et ea quae stmt per se entis inquantum
Contra Pen tiles, ii, 83 Jp* li^7» By the
expression"^natural*, 'at.Yhomas seems to mean that wnieh is
initially present. This becomes clear from nis references
to t«e non-natural wnien 'acouirloaus per ld quod est
naturals:" Tr.e natural is tnat initial •state1' trbm which
*fcae non-natural is produced,
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aolONDodi; in qua cognitiono fondatur primoruffl
principiorma notitla, ut non e > M auiaul affirmere et neg&re, et alia huluemodi.'10
The above text serves tc point out it, Thomas*
view of tue nature of first principles.

We know because of

U.e power of our intellect, cue since t;.e intellect is only
one power, it can have only one proper object.

Yet, in

.mother sense, since all existing things are knowable, all
ol these things are objects of tne Intellect,

hence, the

one natural object of tne knowing power must at the same
time contain under it, as it were, all things knowable by
the intellect,

Bit since the Intellect can know all things,

tne natural object of the Intellect must be that under which
is contained all things, that is, being.
joiow,

being is the most universal.

For of all that we

The first principles

are founded on this knowledge of being,
ledge Is tne result of first principles.

Scientific know
St, Thomas refers

to them as the cause of tue conclusions which fall under
them.

Me states nis own position clearly in the 3 m m

iheologlae, when he points out that,
kt propter hoc etias circa illas propositiones
errare non potest, quae statist cognoscuntur
cognita tertfilnorum quidditate, sicut aceldit
circa prima principia* ex qulbus etiajs accldlt
infallibilitas verlt&tis, secundum certitudineia
sclenti&e, circa conclusiones.*»
^
^

vontra Gentries. ii, C3

/£•

1^47*

Tbeol. 1# S5, 6, c.
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It is evident from the texts ire have seen that,
for Aristotle and St. Thomas, truly scientific knowledge
results from first principles or indemonstrable propositions.
''nd it is further agreed by these two pnllosophers that
these principles cannot themselves be reached by demonstra
tion, nor are they known by some sort of Innate idea or
concept.

Aristotle states that we must arrive at them

through some inductive process, while St. Thomas declares
them to be known naturally.
It can be seen from this that the act and potency
proposition must be either a first principle or a conclu
sion from some first principle.

We must, therefore, inquire

into our knowledge of being, upon which all first principles
are related to discover whether either the order proposition
or the set and potency proposition can be considered a first
principle or how they can be demonstrated from a first
principle.
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CMAPT&h FIVE
The solution to the problem with which we are
concerned in this theele rests in establishing a causal
relation between potentiality and actuality*

It has been

seen1 that potency and act are related In that we know the
potency of a thing In terms of some corresponding act|
i.e. a potency Is always the potency of some specific
actuality*
to act.

In this way potency may be said to be related

It is also clear 2 that this type of a relation

ship cannot be used to establish a relationship between
effect and cause.
hence w# must go beyond the mere definition of
the terms ’potency* and *act», to establish whether the
o n e is related causally to tne other.

To accomplish this,

let as first consider ..ow v?e come to know potency in a
a.illif-;.

It is clear tnit xt; regard to all things that we

know, we must know ti eir activity, for we know the activity
ci a cnihg fc.-rough xta act.
Now, altnougi. we can

nvf a concept of being

wmc«. can be extended so all tuingc, we cannot say tnat
ie*iig can be univccaliy predicated of all

tuings.3

1 See above, p. 10
* See above, p. lo - 11.

3 see Sms. tVeol. I,

13, 6, c.
41
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a tiling 1» only Insofar as It acts.

And the activity of the
ii
thing depends on the form of the thing.
That which has not
the fora of a dog can not have the act of a dog.

Or, that

which »as not the fora of (action can rat actually be in
motion.

Moreover, since nothing exists of which you cannot

ask the question, *woat is it!*, it is clear that all things
which are have forms.

In fact, it is upon the acquisition

of a fora that a thing begins to exist.

Thus, when one

animal generates another, another fora is produced, and hence
another being.**

In this sense, fora is the vehicle of being.

And since a thing is only insofar as it is in activity,
then fora is also, in this sense, the vehicle of activity.
That which has the fora has the activity.

Thus that which

has the fora of ration has the actual ration.

And conversely,

that which lacks the fora of ration cannot have the ration.
Now, since all things do not have the sane activity, as for
Instance, the activity of one animal differs from the acti
vity of another, then activity cannot be univocally predi
cated of all things, but must be predicated upon consideration
of the fora of the thing.

Similarly, being, which is in a

sense dependent on the fora of the thing, cannot be predicated
4 Bee Suraa Contra Qcntllgl, ii.*»5 3 .
autea per se consequitur ad foraan.

14J7.

Iffitt

5 dee Ibid. ill.65 3 *
here St. Thomas mentions
that man is not the cause of human fora hut is Just the
cause of the fora cooing to be in matter. Nonetheless, the
man begins to be when the fora begins to be*
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onlvocally of all things.
Now, that all tilings are net pure being and pure
act la evident from a study of motion.
motion is evident to the senses.

That things are in

As Aristotle has said!

"the existence of motion is asserted by all who have any*
thing to say about nature."6

Against tne objection of the

skeptic who eight say that there is no motion, there seees
to be no argument.?
be proved.

Motion is not an assuaption that need

It is rather a faet that need merely be

recognized.
Now from the faet that things are in notion, it
is evident that things ehange.

Motion is between contraries.

That whleh is in notion oust move from something to sooething.

And that fro® which it ooves cannot be identified

with that to which it neves, for in this case it is
obvious that there would be no motion.

But since notion,

as has already been pointed out, is evident, it follows that
motion must involve contraries.^
g

A notion from one contrary to another is a change.
In every ehange new fora is acquired.

For example, when a

6 Ihya. vlii.l (250b 15 j.
7 **• i!£§*

8

U & * b 25 -

185a

7).

See Ibid. v.5 (22$?& 30 - 229b 9 ).

• Ibid. v.5 (229a 3u). "Motion is a change Cron a
particular subject to a particular subject."
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man*a hair changes froo black to gray, the fora of grayness
x*eplaees the fora of blackness.

Similarly, when something

lasgins to move, it acquires a new fora of motion and loses
the fora associated with rest.

Something in motion is eon*

binually acquiring and losing forms as it changes its
position,

for a thing is and acts through its fora, and to

acquire a new activity is to acquire a new fora.

But to

acquire motion, or to be in motion, demands the acquisition
of a new activity for the activity of a body in motion is
different from the activity of a body at rest.

Moreover,

the activity of a mover changes as the mover aoves, and,
:iince the position of the mover is always changing, the
mover must be continually acquiring and losing forms in
relation to its position.

Consequently, it follows that

motion necessitates the acquisition of a fora, and, there
fore, motion is a change.
tet us now examine the process of change.

Change,

as we have already seen, involves contraries in that it is
always from something to something.

As Aristotle has

pointed out, a thing changes insofar as it is capable of
changing.

In this sense ehange involves potency.

change is movement from potency to aot.*Q

For a

An exaaple of

this can be found in the examination of the thing which
changes fro® the state of rest to the state of motion.
ilH2* fheol. I, 2, 3, e. Jfrlam Via?.
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because the thing has changed from rest to aotion, ire can
say that this thing while it was at the state of rest, was
capable of notion, that is, potentially in notion.
We cannot deduce froro this knowledge, however,
that the thing must have been acted upon in order that it
be actually In motion.11- For to say that a thing is poten
tially in motion is to say that It is capable of acquiring
a new fora.

To say that it is actually in motion means only

that it actually possesses this form.

From our knowledge of

potency based on change alone, there seems to be no principle
causally relating potency to act.
We must go beyond this first

impression of potency

to discover how a thing in potency can be reduced to act.
It is clear that nothing has a potency for ail things.
all beings which change arelimited as
can become.

to that which they

An animal, forinstance, without wings,

potency to fly.

For

has no

Hor has a fish the capability of breathing.

In this sense it is clear that the potencies of things axe
limited.

And, by limited we mean not limited in the sense

of a potency not being fulfilled because of some external
Etienne ailson, Yhe Christian Philosophy of St.
Thomas Aquinas, trmns. C l . Shook, C.&.& (iiew¥ork, 1956) •
Wilson considers motion in terms of act and potency,
particularly in his discussion of the Friwa Via* His
discussion, however, seems to be of lifflevalue to this
work. Rather than being critical, it simply appears to be
a re-statement of what dt. Thomas says. The act and
potency proposition is not questioned here but seems to be
accepted on Its face value. (See pp. 59-60)*
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power preventing Its fulfilment, such as Inactive senses
might prevent the fulfilment of the potency of the Intel*
Leot; we mean rather the limitations of the thing itself,
for as we have seen there are certain things for which sooe
beings have no potency*
It follows frota what has been said that the
potentiality of the thing is deteralned by its nature.

The

reasons for this can be more clearly seen in the following.
Ail things act according to their nature.
dog because it is its nature to do so.

A dog acts as a

A M because the

nature is limited to *dog*, a dog has no potency to take
on the activity proper to another animal,

how, with regard

to a M i n g which is in act, to know the nature of the
thing is the sane as to know the activity.12

In relation

to motion, when the nature of a thing in notion is under*
stood, its activity is also understood.
Nature is not, however, simply expressive of the
activity.

For, as we have seen, things are not always in

activity.

A boy, for Instance, is not actually an adult

since he lacks the accidental fora required to beeoae an adult.
He is, however, potentially an adult because it is his
nature to become one.

Mature, in this sense, is expressive

of the end of the thing.

That Is, to know the nature of

12 See above, p. 12.
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the thing is not merely to know the activity of thing, but
it is also to know the potentiality of the thing.*3
How we have seen that a thing can change only
insofar as it is capable of ciianging.

It la also clear

that that to which the potency of the thing extends Is
deteralned by its nature,

nature is, in this way, the

cause of the change in the thing.

It exercises causality

In that it is according to it that the thing changes.
Mature, as the cause of the potentiality of the tiling, is,
in a way, the cause of the reduction of potency to act.
A hoy becones a nan because it is his nature to do so.
this sense, nature is the cause of changes

In

change is the

moveaent ftroa potency to act; that which is in potency is
capable of being in act, and is deteralned to certain sets
because of the nature of the thing, as a heavy body, be
cause of its nature, is potentially in downward Motion;
since that which the thing is capable of besetting is deter
mined by nature, then the basoning or change is in this way
caused by nature.
Mature is the cause of all activity insofar as
it orders the activity of ail things,

for order scans simply

suat ail things act according to their natures.
this way that order is related to naturea

It is in

all things neve

*3 Metaph. v.4 (1015a 17}• “And nature in this sense
is the source of aoveaent of natural objects, being present
in thea soaehow, either potentially or in coaplete reality.**
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aeoordijig to their natures} and since all thins* wove
according to their nature, nature is a cans# of notion of
tilings*

Mature docs not cause the notion itself hut rather

causes the ordering of the motion.3^
In terms of activity and potency, this can he
explained as felloes.

A thing is in activity insofar as

it possesses the fora of the activity} a thing is in
potency insofar as it is capable of possessing the fore of
the activity.

Mow we have already seen that tne poten

tiality of the thing is determined by its nature.

In this

sense, the acquisition of a new form, that is the reduction
from potency to activity, is caused by the nature.

Mow

the nature itself does not supply the fora which is acquired
in a Change, but rather directs the thing which undergoes
change as a final cause.^
It may be argued that a motion can be caused in
respect to finality and uncaused in respect to efficiency}
i.e. that tne same motion can be at the same tine caused
and uncaused in respect to different causes.

For example,

when we perceive any ordered motion, of which an efficient
** l£22* viii.l (252a 12;.
tne cause of order.
^ hetaph. v.t
with essence as the
Nature by directing
cause; i.e. the end
ment of the nature.

", . . nature is everywhere

(lul^a lu;. here nature is identified
"end of the process of becoming.*
the thing to its end, acts as a final
of every natural change is the fulfil
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lt> diioj in pro, .nan, "T;.c ; aminy. of Mature," fae Ihoalst.
i ...a, <pp. 3^3-^wlj• Xn tiiia article^ it is seen timfc
f ■■■''sc acr: be ,tt number of Kesnin-^s of ti.e forr, ’nature •.
it is concluded, ticlever, tnat in every instance, "nature
if’ considered . . . In one \-my or anotaer no principle of
fiovementU fioreover, insofar as the nature determines
tan motion to an end, it la also the cause of isoveosent.
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CHAPTER S U
Concerning m m vxew tn&t it is possible tiiat a
uaing in motion may tiave no efficient cause whatsoever, let
us examine tie classical objection formulated in tne philo
sophy of David rfurae,

In £ treatise on nuaan jNature. one of

tne central themes is causality.
name begins tne treatise with an explanation of
itaaan Knowledge,
All perceptions of tne nuaan Kind resolve
themselves into two distinct Kinds, which i
snail call impressions and Ideas. The differ
ence betwixt these consists in the degrees of
force and liveliness, with which they strike
upon the mini, and make their way into our
thought or consciousness, those perceptions
which enter with most force and violence, we
may name impressionsi and, under this name, X
comprehend all' our sensations, passions, and
emotions, as they make their first appearance
in tne soul* By ideas. X mean the faint images
of these in thinking ami reasoning . •
To clarify the relationship between impressions and ideas,
■ie later adds,
. , , that all our simple ideas In their first
appearance, are deriv1J from simple impressions,
which are correspondent to the®, and which they
exactly represent.2
In U ixe .-;ay a ores est&bilaaed tne fact that all of
axx ia«ut are related to impressions*

Taey are, In fact.

1 David H m m , n Treatise of human nature, sd. D* A *
- e lb y —lilg g s ^DxfoXvi,
X,
- r & T T r
2 i b i d . i,

i, i g .

47.

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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distinguished as different kinds of perception merely
because of their vivacity and because tne one is always
prior to the o t h e r . 3

Although impressions ari ideas can be

distinguished in this way, there is a more important way
in which they are related to each other:

5,,Ihat idea of red

wnica we form in the dark, and that impression which strikes
our eye in sunshine, differ only in degree, not in nature.**
^rous this it is clear that tiume's ideas are related to his
impressions as an image is related to a sensation.

These

impressions and ideas make up as we have seen, "all the per
ceptions of the human mind.*
When examining the content of the mind, we some
times find that the representation of an impression "retains
a considerable degree of Its first vivacity."

This leads

home t
oposit the existence of the memory, which "preserves
tne original forts in which its objects were presented. "5
ft second principle, wnich finds in the mind, is the imagi
nation to which he gives the liberty "to transpose and
cuarige its ideas,
" . . . All simple ideas may be separated by the
iisagination and may be united again in what form it
3

I, I, I Jp. 27.

* ibid. i, i, i j>. 37.
& JM2*

1 X 1 3 • 17*

6 Ibid. I, I, III yj. 1&7.
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p le a s e s ." ?

C o n cern in g t h i s s e p a r a tio n and uniting of ideas,

hums points out t h a t chance a lo n e c o u ld not account for
th is .

There is, b e h in d t h i s a c t i v i t y , a 'uniting principle*

w hich acts as a ’’g e n t le fo r c e " on the imagination.

The

f o r c e behind the uniting of ideas acts according to certain
q u a l i t i e s by w h ich the ideas a r e related*

The qualities, froej which this association
arises, and by which the mind is after this
manner convey'd free one idea to another, are
three, vis. Resemblance, Contiguity in tine or
place, and Cause and effect.®
it is the relation of our Ideas in terns of cause and
effect that we must now consider.
While the resemblance and contiguity of ideas are
relations that lead nowhere, with regard to cause and effect
triere is *a necessary connexion to be taken into consider
ation."
is*

The problem which home sets up for aimseif, then,

"For what reason

*c pronounce it necessary, that

everything whose existence has a beginning, should also
have a c a u s e ." '

hums answers the problem in this ways
But here is an argument, which proves at
once, that the foregoing proposition is neither
intuitively nor demonstrably certain. We can
never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to
7 Hur^ » I# I# xv 3 *

*h7«

6 ibid. i, i, v i 3 * 117.
J Ibid. I, ij.1, IX 3

• 7j§7*
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©very new existence, or new modification of
existence, without shewing at the sane time the
impossibility tnere is, tn&t any thing can ever
begin to exist without some productive prin
ciple | and where the latter proposition cannot
be proved, we must despair of ever being able
to prove tne former.*^
.t.urse points out that ao^e philosophers argue that since all
objects come into existence at a certain tiae and in a cer
tain place, there must be some cause to fix its beginning
in time and place, or else it will always remain in "eternal
suspense,"

He asks, however,

Is there any tsore difficulty in supposing the
tine and place to be fix*d without a cause,
than to suppose the existence to be determined
in that manner? The first question that occurs
on this subject is always, whether the object
shall exist or not; The n e x i / wnen and where
it shall begin to exist. If the removal o f a
cause be intuitively absurd in tne one case,
it must be so in the other* And if th-\t
absurdity be not clear without a proof in the one
case, it will equally require one in the
other.**
That is, in order to use space and time to demonstrate that
»very thing which begins to exist must nave a cause, it must
also be demonstrated that time and place nave a cause.

Since

the latter can be supposed to be fixed without a cause, then
tne former may also be supposed to be uncaused.

Similarly, if it is argued that, if the existence
of a thing is not caused by another, then it must be caused
iiume, I, III, III 2p. W *
11 I*>ld. I* ill* X U 3 *

327*
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5*

by i t s e l f ,

Hume r e p l i e s ;

But to say that anything i s produced, or to
express myself sort properly, comes Into
existence, without a cause, I s not to affir®
that *tls Itself its own cause) But on the
contrary in excluding a l l external causes,
exeludos a fortiori the thing Itself which is
created. An object, that exists absolutely
without any cause, certainly is not its own
cause| and when you assert, that the one fol
lows from the other, you suppose the very point
i n question, and talcs it for granted, tiuit *tis
utterly iapesslfele any thing ean ever begin to
exist without a cause, but that, upon the
exclusion of one productive principle, we mast
still nave recourse to another,12
Those who hold this position are, according to Hume, evading
th e real problem.

Hume's position is, then, that the pro

position "that nothing can ever begin to exist without some
productive principle," cannot be d e m o n s t r a t e d . ^
In regard to the aet and potency proposition, it
is

c le a r that It f a l l s

against the argument of Hume.

Botn

the proposition against which Hume is arguing and the act
and potency proposition state that prior to any change in
the activity of anything there must exist some tiling which
12 Hume, I, III, III

8l7.

*3 ft number of Thomiats take refuge in this argument,
Dardell, for instance, states that all we must do is con
sider the logical possibilities of "whatever is moved"t
in this ease, he states, three possibilities avail themselvesj that "whatever Is moved* is moved by nature alone,
or by itself alone, or by nature and by itself simul
taneously. Although this is a valid reconstruction of
at. Thomas' argument, it nevertheless fails to take into
account this cogent objection of Hume, dee H. D. dardell,
O.P*. Introduction to the Philosophy of Ht. Thomas Aoulnas.
trans."Jolm A T m o T ^ ^ u l s , ”’l f P ) 7 V T l # r ^
-----
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in causally responsible for that change.

Therefore, If

home*a objection is valid, the act and potency proposition
cannot be demonstrated•**
Bow then, are we to regard the demonstration of
this principle as given in the previous chapter?

This

demonstration, stated simply, argues that because the acti
vity of all things is toward an end deteralned by their
n a t u r e , the act and potency proposition must hold true, at

least in regard to final causality.

Hues argues that we

cannot know that any particular activity demands a cause,
Tne explanation for this obvious contradiction lies in the

fact that Hume refuses to take into consideration an all
^ Brother Benignus has an Interesting objection
against the Humeian position that things night be "naturally
in notion without any cause of their motion. Bis position
is based on the idea that such a statement contradicts
Aristotle*a definition of notions it "wist deny that
notion is the continuing actualization of potency". Although
hose hiaself does not speak of notion in terns of potency
ami act, a "Huneian" position night be stated in those terns,
i.e. notion is the actualization of potency without a cause.
In other words, Buna's position would sinply state that a
being can nova fro* potency to act without the aid of any
being in act. Brother Benlgxtns* objection then is nothing
else than the assumption of the validity of the act and
potency proposition, an assumption we have seen, which is
not necessarily justified. See Brother Benignus, F.S.C.,
Mature
(Hew fork, 19*7), P. 80.
The Metaphysics of St. Thomas
leg p p f % S I& r ~lteifc errs in
Aquinas. (Milwaukee, 195®)
the saae way. Against the objection that there might be no
causality, he assumes a causal relationship between potency
and act which is true tut cannot be demonstrated. It is
clear that neither of these objections solve the problem
set up by Hume.
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Important premise:

that the activity of a thing la deter

mined by the nature of the thing.
To aay that activity is determined by nature
indicates that the nature of a thing ean be known.

To know

the nature of a thing is to know that towards which the
activity of the thing necessarily tends.

For instance, when

we say that fire necessarily produces heat, we purport to
have some understanding of the nature of fire.

According to

St, Tnomas, because things are naturally determined to some
ends, man nay, in a limited way, predict the future.*5
hence, to know the nature of the thing, is to knew the final
cause of the activity of the thing.
It is this very knowledge of the nature of the
thing that Hume will net allow:
There is no object, which implies the existence
of any other if we consider these objects in
themselves, and never look beyond the ideas
which we form of them.10
There cannot be, for Hume, a certain knowledge of a thing
as directed towards an end.

Since no idea considered in

itself implies anything else, then there is no basis in
home for talking about things as natures.

To speak of a

thing as a nature must be in terms of its finality, aid
^ JSS* Theol. i, 86, t, e. "Sed prout sunt in suis
cauala. cogaosSObaaunt etiam a nobis. slisiQuidem..
in suis caucic slnt ut ex qulbus ex necessitate pfovenlant.

eoiwwuntiir p w w t l t y i M . .al.ntl.ej » iw. ..fcrolaci.
praccognoaclt ecilpsim futuran." This could also apply
to’predicting th&fcheatwiii oe produced by fire.
Hume, I, III, VI Jp. ^ 7 .
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c-.iurefore, in terns of something w»iica it «aay not actually
hence, to lenow a no tars ’.a also to know, by n eo es-

avc.

ry irapiication, an end or, in
c -latence*
*

torus, another

It uant be cone . n- . tnen
.4

1

1

nt tne j*/rIiings of

bear oat */■>- . »v-— ^ r t U »v >oos i^ot *
.v.nj natures,

t

0

1

*• l»i-X ige a
2

3

, u t least, j«s does n o t act as though we

serve no v-s pome **ere to a tte m p t to

n gue against Hume's position as such.
;.n tae very principles o f philosophy.
„ii things and accepted,

if it

The difference l i e s
nature must be seen

is not seen or accepted no

amount o f argumentation w i l l ortaiige tale.

Ue mu3t c o n c lu d e ,

s.herefore, that insofar as it aas been shown that e v e ry
movement fro® potency to act a as a final ca use, Hume's
iuguieent has no bearing.
It does, tiowever, nave a bearing on whether an
• a c t iv ity may take p la c e wituout there b e in g an e f f i c i e n t

cause,

What Hume nas r e a l l y pointed out i s th e f a c t t h a t

tn e re i s a real p o s s i b i l i t y o f an activity b e in g uncaused,
he does not prove that any a c t i v i t y i s i n fact uncaused, b u t

cic/iy indicates tiu*t i t might be uncaused,

hence, i t

re?--ains t o discu ss whether a change which moves to w a rd s a
natural end cm; be random with reference to an e f f i c i e n t
s-ttiii0 *
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I n o rd e r to show t h a t f i n a l c a u s a lit y cannot
o p e r a te w ith o u t e f f i c i e n t c a u s a l i t y ,
to go more d e e p ly in t o

it

i s f i r s t n e c e s s a ry

tn e n a tu r e o f f i n a l c a u s a l i t y ,

We

have seen t h a t th in g s w hich move move to w ard s some e n d .
Ana we have a ls o seen t n a t t h i s end i s
tn e m o tio n .

How, th e n , does th e e n d , o r f i n a l ca u se , e f f e c t

t h a t w hich i s

i n m otion?

t h i s q u e s tio n i s
m o tio n .

tn e f i n a l cause o f

We nave seen t n a t th e answ er to

t h a t th e f i n a l cause g iv e s o r d e r t o th e

I t re m a in s , how ever, to d e te rm in e th e way i n w hich

order i s g iv e n t o th e t h in g t h a t i s I n m o tio n .

It

would

seem t h a t th e e f f e c t o f f i n a l c a u s a li t y c o u ld be a d e q u a te ly
exp ressed h e re by th e te rm

• d i r e c t i o n 1, *

as th e end o f th e a c t i v i t y ,
d ir e c tio n .

arrow, i t

e ffe c ts

The f i n a l cau se,

tn e m o tio n by g i v in g i t

Thus in th e case o f a p r o j e c t i l e ,

such as an

i s th e t a r g e t r a t t i e r th a n th e a r c h e r w hich Is most

p r o p e r ly r e s p o n s ib le f o r I t s
It

d ir e c tio n .

can be argued n e re t h a t s in c e tn e a r c h e r i s

quite o b v io u s ly r e s p o n s ib le f o r th e p r o je c t in g o f th e a rro w
* dine© a i l m o tio n i s to a p a r t i c u l a r end (s e e p , hj)
tu s n th e e f f e c t o f th e f i n a l cause may be c o n s id e re d as
• d i r e c t i n g * th e m o tio n o f th e t h in g t o I t s p ro p e r e n d .
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he is also responsible for tne direction.

In addition, it

wouli see# that in certain cases, for instance if the archer
ahot the arrow blindly in the air, when there le no intended
end, the archer surely must be solely responsible for the
direction of the arrow.
Against this argument, it suet be pointed out that
even leaving aside the causality of the archer, this does not
m a n that there is no final causality involved in such an
action.

It must be remembered that the arrow is not simply

an instrument of the archer.

That is, the arrow is itself

an entity,2 and as such, has a nature of its own.

Conse

quently, the end of the notion of the arrow will be accor
ding to the nature of the arrow.

That is, because of its

nature as arrow, an arrow in notion follows a certain path.
It follows that, the end of a moving arrow is that to which
the arrow according to its nature tends.

Furthermore, it

tan be seen that to achieve its end the arrow naturally
assumes a certain direction.

In this way, then, it is clear

that that which is nest responsible for the direction of a
notion is the end or the final cause.

In the ease where the

archer aims the a. row at a target, it is a matter of the
archer using the arrow as an instrument, attempting to
project the arrow in such a way so that that at which he is
2 In reality, the end of the motion of the arrow must
always be considered in relation to the end of the archer.
However, if you consider only the arrow Itself, as a thing
in motion, It still is in motion towards an end.
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aiming and the cna of the natural movement of the a r m *
coincide.

It foliowo, therefore, that the final c&uae

affects the thing in motion, by giving direction to ita
motion.
In regard to what has been said stove, that the
final cause is responsible for the direction of the notion,
the following problem arises.

Can the final cause be respoa*

sible for the direction without being the efficient cause
of the motion?

That is, to cause direction is. In a sense,

to cause motion; to direct is to move.

And in this sense,

the final cause actually becomes an efficient cause.

In

answer to this problem, it would appear to be perfectly true
to assert that that which actually directs a motion Is an
efficient cause,

however, we must here make a distinction

between direction and directing.

The final cause, as the

end of the motion is the cause of the direction of the motion.
This final cause, uowever, qua final cause must by its nature
lack efficacy.

Hence the final cause cannot itself be the
k
cause of the directing of the thing.
In order, therefore,
that a thing in motion assume a direction towards its end
it must be directed to this end by an efficient cause.
3 Every physical thing, because of its size and shape,
will assume a motion which is proper to it, or natural.
^ bee Metaoh. xli.6 (1072b *t). "The final cause, then,
produces motion as being loved.* It cannot therefore be
confused with moving cause.
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Arid It la in this way that we see the necessary
coincidence of final and efficient causality.

As we have

seen, efficient causality by itself can only account far
random motion.

And we have further seen in the proceeding

paragraph that while final causality can account for the
direction of the notion, it lacks the efficacy to itself
direct the motion.^
Thus, it follows that in every Instance of a
thing moving towards an end, there must be present both
final and efficient causality*

For as soon as the motion

of the moving thing assumea a direction towards an end,
final causality becomes evident.

The final cause can only

be responsible for this direction as a final cause*

That

is, it lacks the efficacy to itself move the thing In any
direction.

Therefore, it necessarily follows that a notion

which has direction cannot be due entirely to the final
cause of the notion.
Moreover, frota this it may be concluded that there
is an efficient cause for all motion,

for, it has been seen

that in every motion which assumes a direction towards an
end, there oust tr something which has the efficacy to
direct the sotion towards the end.

And that which gives

**
m * 2 (202a 9). We have already seen that an
object in notion is continually acquiring new foras.
Although this thing moves ’for the sake o f ’ an end this end
cannot give the form: "The mover or agent Efficient cause7
will always be the vehicle of a fora."
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the thing the motion towards the end is the efficient cause.
There is, however, no Instance of motion which is not di
rected towards an end,*>

For,

as

we have seen, all things

operate

according to their natures.

cording

to a nature is to stove towards an end.

things

which

no

thing

it

Which

is

is
not

evident, however, that there can be

nature.^

There can

nature; for all motion is ordered

a

intelligible, and,

and

Thus, only

not natures could be capable of moving in

are

random motion,

Bat, to operate ac

m

be,

Aristotle has shown, order demands
therefore, no such thing as random

motion, that is, uncaused notion, either in terns of finality
or

efficiency.
Further, it can be seen that with respect to both

efficiency and finality the notion is on*?.®

That is, the

directing of the notion, and the direction of the motion, and
the aotion itself, are all one.
that

From this it can be seen

there must be a relationship between the final and effi

cient cause.

And it can further be seen that the first cause

6 sutaBa Contra Gentiles. 111.3 /p. 2257.
ot sotus eat propter aliouaa perfectionec.
4WWWHWWMHMSMM*

4SV*

"Omnls actio

WMWMMNMWHWMIMiieMMWWSM*’

7 see above, p. 17*
S JSjjro. Theol. I, 44, 4, c. "£at autea idem finis
ngentia et oatientls. Inquantua huluaaodl. sea sifter et
~aiter: uhu^ eniro ei Idem est auod aitens iniendlt
recipere. * ' '
...~~r'''"r
* 1
.1 1
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of motion la the final cause.

That Is, the final cause

causes the efficient cause to cause the activity.5
The necessity of efficient and final causality
and their interrelation is seen quite clearly In the example
given above— *in the case of the arc!» r shooting the arrow
at the target.

The archer Is obviously the efficient cause

and the target is the final cause.

The presence of the end

isoves the efficient cause to put the object In motion.
There are, however, other cases in which the causality Is
not quite so evident.

X will discuss briefly two of these.

The first of these is generationi

that is, the

coming to be of a thing, for example, an animal.

In gen

eration, the first thing which is obvious is that one animal
produces anotheri that is, the parent is the efficient cause
of its offspring.

What is not so evident, however, is the

final cause of the end of generation.

In regard to this

problem there are two possible solutions.

Tim one is that

that which is first produced, the fetus, is the end of the
act of generation.

The other is that the fully grown mature

a.iimal is the end*

If we say that the end of generation in

animals is the fetus, then we must explain the change from
fetus to maturity.

Timt is, we must explain this latter

change in terms of efficient and final causality.

What is

^ ^h” »a Contra Pantiles. ili.1T M ,
"Finis inter
alia. <*m ». nrUatow obtlnafc. «t *b T w o o w w . alia. o a u w

habent quod sint causae in actut aaens onin non salt nisi
pro&ter ranch.4
' "' '.tv ' -■
.. .....
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tne

final cause;

growth?

that

is,

what

gives direction to the

It is evident from sense observation that that to

waich all animals naturally tend is maturity*

In other words

a puppy grows into a nature dog, a calf into a cow, etc.
That, then which gives direction to growth is fulfilment,
taat is a fulfilled nature.
What Is the efficient cause of growth; that is,
what is the efficient cause of the fetus growing to maturity?
Could it be the food and nutrition which appear to be a
cause of growth?

This does not appear likely because there

is no apparent relationship between nutrition as an effi
cient cause and maturity as a final cause.

In this sense,

the growth imparted by the nutrient would be seemingly random
as was the motion of tne arrow shot blindly by the archer
seemingly random.
cf

In the latter case, however, the nature

the arrow prevented the motion from being random.

Could

this argument be applied to tne case under consideration?
Xiiat is, could it be that the nature of the fetus directs the
growth given by the nutrients toward maturity?
To answer this question it must be remembered that
the mature animal is a fulfilled or complete animal, and
taat a fetus is, in this sense, only an incomplete animal.
It follows from this that the nature of a fetus is also in
complete.

The nature of a fetus stands to the nature of the
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mature animal
Tut-refore,

as

a

being

the nature of

growth to maturity.

in
tne

a

being in act*

fetus cannot be a cause of the

Tnat is, since the fetus is only poten

tially fulfillei, it cannot
filment.

potency to

be

responsible for its own ful

It follows therefore, tn&t since tne fetus cannot

direct Itself towards maturity, that which produces the
fetus
end

must

of

itself direct it towards maturity*

generation is the mature animal.

Therefore the

The fetus, rather

titan being the end of generation, is, in a sense, the be
ginning

of generation*

The generator, which is actually

fulfilled, directs the fetus, which is potentially fulfilled,
towards

actual fulfilment*

The growth from fetus to fulfil

ment is, in this sense, one motion imparted by the generator
s-tn

tne fulfilled animal nature

as

the end*

The second difficulty wnich will be discussed here
is

that

of circular or rotary motion.

Let us take for example

Wie motion of the moon around the eartn*

It is clear that

moon is moved according to its nature by a final cause*

the

Tiia problem here is that the motion of this body is appar
ently uncaused, i.e. not efficiently caused.
be

a

Could this not

case of a thing in motion which is not moved by another?

In light of what we have said, this cannot be true.

A body

moving in such a manner is continually assuming new directions
and new positions*

But that to which the body is tending, as

a final e&uae lacks the efficiency to be itself solely respon
sible for these changes*

There must, therefore, be an
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efficient cause of

these

changes.

However, It might toe

that the motion of the moon, toeing circular, is tbs

objected

end of its natural tiy&t is, tiiat the motion is the activity
of the moon.

In this ease, however, there would toe no

eaunge, i.e. no movement from potency to act since the
i.otion would be fcue end of the talng.
here

would

be

What we would have

motion but without changej that Is there would

be no transition from potency to
fore, that even if motion

and

act.

It can be seen, there

end are one, a highly unlikely

position, the act and potency proposition remains true;
being

no

In potency can toe reduced to act except toy a being in

act.

In conclusion, it has been established that the
act

and potency proposition
And

motion.

can

not

it

can toe seen

properly

toe

must

toe true in order to explain

further

regarded

as

that

this

proposition

a principle, in that it can

be demonstrated.

It follows from this that one should be

able to arrive at

this

stration.

conclusion through a scientific demon

That is, beginning with certain truths one should,

tarough the use of the syllogism arrive at the act and potency
proposition as % conclusion.
The argument may be put in syllogistic form.

We

are attempting to snow that every motion requires tooth a
final and an efficient cause.
the necessity of a final cause.

We will begin toy demonstrating
From observation we see that
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ev*2ry motion Is a change.

And we see also that every cnange

is orderly:
A
Therefore,

Avery change is orderly
Every isotion Is a on&nge
Every motion is orderly

By observing the way in which tilings operate, it
i'o

evident that order is caused by the nature of the thing.

And in the same way, it is clear that nature tends towards
■in end:
B

Everything natural tends towards an end
Every orderly motion is natural
Therefore, Every orderly motion tends towards an end
By using the conclusion from syllogism A as the
minor premise and the conclusion frost syllogism B as tne
major premise:
c

Every orderly motion is to an end (Conel. of 3^
Every motion is orderly motion
(Conel. of Ay
Therefore, Every motion is to an end
Bit the end of a motion is, by definition, the
final cause:
D

Every end is a final cause
Every motion is to an end (Conel. of C)
Therefore, Every motion has a final cause
Xt is concluded, therefore, that every motion has
a final cause.

Moreover, by definition again, it is

that every reduction from potency to act is a motion.
Therefore, the following demonstration is true:
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...very motion has a final cause (Conel. of
Every reduction from potency to act is a
motion
Therefore, Every reduction from potency to act has a
final cause

D)

Therefore, tnat no being in potency can be reduced to act
except by a being in act is demonstrated scientifically in
relation to final causality.
It remains then, to demonstrate that every re
action from potency to act has an efficient cause.

We

cegin by observing the fact that every ordered motion is in
a direction;
F

Every orderly motion is in a direction
Every motion is orderly notion (Conel.of A)
Therefore, Every motion is in a direction
v/e have furthex- seen by a dialectical argument that direction
requires a director.

That is, in order that a tiling assure

a direction there must be something which has the efficacy
to move it in that direction;
3

Everything with direction has an efficient
cause
Every motion has direction (Conel. of F)
Therefor®, Every motion has an efficient cause
ind it follows from this therefore, as in syllogism fi, that
every reduction from potency to act has an efficient cause.
In this way trie basic objection as voiced by Hume
and others is answered.

There is no way in which a motion

could exist without having an efficient and a final cause.
dinoe all motion assumes a direction towards an end, it is
quite clear that all motion has a final cause,

however.
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linco

final

irection
c ten

all

causality

because it

necessarily
raced

lacks

tne

efficacy to Impart motion,

motion need® an efficient as well as a final cause*

since all

*nd

cannot itself b© responsible for the

motion

follows

is a reduction fro® potency to act it
that

*no being in potency can be r©»

to act except by a being in act *.
The proposition is therefore true and can be

;ec;;or*3trated.

It is necessary but not per so nota.

It may

be itself used In demonstration, for as we have seen, a
true proposition in a premise lead© to a true conclusion.
And because of this, the act and potency proposition, since
it

is

role

Itself expressive of order must assume an important
ir* any philosophy of order.
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